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Developing countries are not merely called upon to solve their
own economic problems. They can make a significant contribu-
tion because they have a concept of life and of human values
which will, I am sure, enable them to help decisively in resolv-
ing basic incompatibilities between technological and spiritual
values.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Uruguay, a country "slightly smaller than Oklahoma," has an
economy that is currently in transition.' Uruguay's external debt,
as of June 1988, reached a high of almost $5.4 billion.2 That places
Uruguay in the position of having one of the highest external debts
per capita in Latin America. During the early 1980s, Uruguay's
gross domestic product shrank by sixteen percent but the economy
has shown some recent signs of recovery.3 The current democratic
government, in a response to these signs, has taken steps "to make
structural reforms to break the general pattern of stagnation that
has marked the economy for the last thirty years.""
The government has utilized several different strategies in its
efforts to combat the country's developmental and debt problems.
One strategy employed, an export-based program, aims to achieve
the "economic growth necessary . . . to meet . . . [the country's]
debt service obligations and to improve the [country's] standard of
living."5 A second strategy, that of attracting foreign investment,
also is being touted as a solution to the debt crisis. An influx of
** Statement by Raul Prebish (Director of CEPAL Review, United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America, Santiago, Chile) at the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, Third Plenary Meeting, 1964.
1. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES - URUGUAY I
(June 1988) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES].
2. Id. at 6. The Uruguayan government is currently working with its creditors and with
the International Monetary Fund in an attempt to manage this burdensome debt.
3. Id. There was a 6.3% growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1986 and an
estimated four percent GDP growth in 1987. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The strategy involves allowing exchange rates to fluctuate, agressively expanding
and diversifying exports, and entering into trade agreements with neighboring countries.
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foreign capital, no matter how desirable, naturally will have an im-
pact on the economy of the receiving nation.
It is both surprising and alarming in light of the government's
heightened interest in attracting foreign investment that neither
Uruguayan legal nor economic scholars have felt compelled to in-
vestigate the consequence that foreign investment has had in Uru-
guay to date.' It is astonishing that one of the most significant ex-
amples of foreign investment in the country, the development of
the seaside resort of Punta del Este,7 has received little, if any,
attention by academicians.
It was not until the enactment of the Foreign Investment Act
of 1974" that the subject of foreign investment even attracted the
attention of Uruguayan scholars. Despite the initial allure, how-
ever, the extent of the analysis has been extremely limited.' Schol-
ars may defend this lack of interest by arguing that foreign invest-
ment has had little effect on the nation's economy and therefore
merits little attention. Even if one were to accept such a statement,
6. Few scholarly works have addressed the issue and those that have attacked the prob-
lem have done so from a taxation perspective. This tendency reflects a general philosophy of
Uruguayan law schools. The Montevideo Law School teaches Contracts, Family Law, and
Criminal Law subjects that undoubtedly involve most of the problems faced by the coun-
try's inhabitants. But other crucial topics are not addressed in the present curricula.
Courses such as International Trade and the GATT Regime, Latin American Integration,
Foreign Debt, and Foreign Investment are glaring in their omission from law school course
offerings. In short, the implication is that lawyers should be more concerned about these
subjects.
7. The resort of Punta del Este lies at the limits of the Plate River. La Paloma, Atlan-
tida & Piriapolis are other growing resort areas. A. MORRIS, SOUTH AMERICA 157 (1987).
8. Statute No. 14.179, D.O. (Uru. Dec. 30, 1974). This is the basic statute regulating
foreign investment in Uruguay. Under this law, authorities have the option to deny the
investor the protective guarantees of the law if the investment is viewed as lacking positive
input for national interests or fails to contribute sufficiently to the country's economic goals.
See DUN'S MARKETING SERVICES, 1988/89 ExPoRTER'S ENCYCLOPAEDIA (83d ed. 1988) (a gen-
eral overview of the Foreign Investment Act of 1974 and its impact on the exporter).
9. See generally D. ASTORI, R. ZERBINO, J. RODRIGUEZ LoPEZ & A. TISNES, INVERSION
EXTRANJERA Y DESARROLLO ECONOMICO (1975); Melgar, Caracteristicas y Perspectivas de la
Inversion Extranjera en America Latina. El Caso Uruguayo, 21 PUBLICACION DEL CENTRO
LATINOAMERICANO DE ECONOMIA HUMANA 15 (1982). A weekly publication, BUSQUEDA, has
covered the topic with some noteworthy articles. The matter is tangentially addressed in
most works dealing with the general economic situation of the country. However, those trea-
tises give the area no special attention. Even the National Development Plan of 1973-1977,
refers only marginally to the subject. See OFICINA DE PLANEAMIENTO Y PRESUPUESTO, PLAN
NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO 1973-1977 30 (2d ed. 1977)[hereinafter OFICINA DE PLANEAMIENTO
Y PRESUPUESTO]. See also Trevino, Mexico: The Present Status of Legislation and Govern-
mental Policies on Direct Foreign Investments, 18 INT'L LAW. 297, 300 (1984) (a different
approach is adopted by the Mexican National Development Plan 1983-1988, which sepa-
rates the policies governing foreign investment from those directed at private capital).
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many questions must be answered before one can close the door on
a study of foreign investment in Uruguay. Two questions that
must be asked are whether Uruguay needs foreign investment at
all, and whether the government should even encourage foreign in-
vestment? But before either of these questions can be answered, a
threshold question must be addressed. What impact has foreign in-
vestment had on the Uruguayan economy to date?1"
The lack of scholarly study in this area could prove disastrous
for future foreign investment in Uruguay. As a country that has
suffered the combined ill-effects of unemployment, low real wages,
and low standards of living,1" it cannot afford to disregard foreign
investment as a possible solution to a sluggish economy. The ab-
sence of any clear theoretical framework by which to evaluate the
impact of foreign investment, at least in part, highlights the futil-
ity of discussing the pros and cons of attracting transnational cor-
porations into the country." In contrast, authors of non-Uru-
guayan citizenship have written extensively on the topic of foreign
investment in Uruguay. It is apparent that foreign investment, as a
topic for analysis, is studied more widely in North America than in
the South. 3 Perhaps this is because the countries that loan the
10. The researcher who tackles the study of the effects of foreign investment in the
country will be faced with several obstacles. One problem is the disorganized state of empir-
ical data collected within the last decade. The researcher will be lucky if he can locate com-
plete data. See Melgar, supra note 9, at 28. This lack of organized empirical data could be
the fault of either the academicians, who have never bothered to gather the information, or
of the national authorities, who have never made the data available in the first place. A
second difficulty is the broadness of the topic. One could write a lengthy dissertation on any
of a number of components of foreign investment (i.e., ownership industries, technology
transfer, or cultural impact).
The interrelation between law, politics and economics creates additional problems. A
multidisciplinary approach is in order to ensure a complete and comprehensive analysis. See
J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 25-29 (1986).
11. U.N. EcON. COMMISSION FOR LATIN AM. AND THE CARIBBEAN, I ECONOMIC SURVEY OF
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 1984 617, U.N. Doc. LC/G1398, U.N. Sales No.
E.86.II.G.2 (1986).
12. See Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational
Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 757-58 (1970).
A definite indication of the difficulties host governments face in dealing with the
[multinational enterprise] is their failure to articulate their concerns about it.
Instead provocative slogans about foreign. . ."control," "domination" or "chal-
lenge" substitute for analysis. Even when studies are done to illuminate the is-
sues . . . there is a tendency to revert to sweeping generality at the political
level.
Id. This dilemma is seen especially in legislation which tends to be vague and unable to
effectively assist in "orderly development ... and apt to produce compromises .... Id.
at 758.
13. See R. DELORME, LATIN AMERICA, 1979-1983: A SOCIAL SCIENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY (1984).
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money are more intellectually curious about the impact of foreign
investment than are the countries that receive it.
It is necessary to begin an analysis of foreign investment in
Uruguay with a look at the country's economy and its foreign in-
vestment history. This will enable us to build a general framework
for the entire study. The first question must be then what Uru-
guay's needs are in terms of foreign investment. In answering that
question one must focus on the role that foreign investment may
play in the country, in light of those identified needs. The analysis,
of course, may lead to vastly different conclusions. Foreign invest-
ment may be beneficial to achieve national goals, or it may not.
Uruguay may need foreign investment only in certain areas, or for-
eign investment may be beneficial only under severe constraints.14
Once the basic needs of the country are determined, a more crucial
question must be posed. How should Uruguay's legislation respond
to those needs in terms of foreign investment? Uruguay's needs
should define the role that foreign investment will play, and in
turn that role should provide the guidelines for the regulation of
the investment.15
14. There are a number of alternative conclusions, but for purposes of this article it is
not necessary to list each one. For a more comprehensive examination of those alternatives
see LaPalombara & Blank, Multinational Corporations and Developing Countries, 34 J.
INT'L AFF. 119 (1980); C. OMAN, NEW FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (1984); INVESTING
IN DEVELOPMENT: NEW ROLES FOR PRIVATE CAPITAL (T. Moran ed. 1986).
15. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States was the setting of a "law and
development" movement. See Trubek & Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis.
L. REV. 1062, 1065 (1979)(for a history of the movement). The "law and development"
movement is only one of several methods used to analyze foreign investment regulations.
The "descriptive-national" approach focuses on the difficulties of interpreting the various
norms. The two general studies done in Uruguay to date are in this category. See N. RODRI-
GUEZ OLIVERA, LA LEY DE INVERSIoNES ExTRANsRAS (1974); J. ZRmINO CAVAJANI, TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS; URUGUAY'S EXPERIENCE (1981)(presented at the World Association of
Lawyers, Tenth Meeting on the Law of the World, Sao Paulo, Brazil). See, e.g., Aranovich &
Hewko, Argentine Laws on Foreign Investments and the Transfer of Technology, 21 INT'L
LAW. 379 (1987)(discussion of principal provisions of Argentine legislation regulating foreign
investment).
The "descriptive-comparative" method compares the regulation in question with provi-
sions enacted in other systems. See J. Bruchou, Foreign Investment in Argentina: A Com-
parative Analysis with the Andean Code (1985) (unpublished manuscript). The main thrust
of the movement was a study of the relationship between law and development in develop-
ing countries. The intellectual components of the movement are "the [search] for law re-
form, the emergence of an interest in law and society, and its various components. . . [and]
the notion of social engineering through law .... " See Merryman, Comparative Law and
Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development
Movement, 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 457, 461-67 (1977). The author includes a bibliographical
appendix of works on law and development. Id. at 484-89.
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This paper will address Uruguay's general economic frame-
work and then examine whether foreign investment is capable of
conforming to the country's domestic needs. The focus will then
shift to the role that foreign investment should play and what con-
straints, if any, ought to be placed upon foreign investment. A re-
view of current foreign investment regulation and policy implica-
tions follows. Finally, and most importantly, this paper will
attempt to answer the question of how the law should respond to
developmental goals in terms of foreign investment in Uruguay. 6
II. THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
URUGUAY
A. Summary of Uruguay's recent economic and foreign in-
vestment history
Up until the 1970s, Uruguay was a democratic island in the
midst of Latin America. 7 Uruguay, situated between Argentina
and Brazil, has "consistently maintained [a delicate balance in its
foreign policy towards the two] from the first days of [its] creation
See also M. FLORY, DROIT INTERNATIONAL Du DEVELOPPEMENT 12, 31 (Ist ed. 1977) (an
interesting view on the instrumentalist role of law with respect to development); Turner,
Canadian Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, in REGULATING THE MULTINATIONAL EN-
TERPRISE 5 (B. Fisher & J. Turner eds. 1983) (a related approach that analyzes the regula-
tion in light of its policy and the political problems that it faces). For all practical purposes,
the movement has come to an end. An examination of the movement suggests that law and
lawyers are instrumental in the search for a path toward development. Law not only regu-
lates the relations among people, but also may assist in achieving certain desired objectives
or "developmental goals." The role of law must not to be overestimated. Law by itself, is
incapable of bringing about development; it is just one tool among many. To the extent that
the focus is on the needs of the country and the role that foreign investment may accom-
plish the satisfaction of those needs, the present study adopts a law and development per-
spective. Indeed, the main question, how the regulation should respond to the country's
requirements concerning foreign investment, is a typical law and development question.
16. Because the objective of this article is merely to provide a framework for the analy-
sis of foreign investment regulation, this is not a comprehensive treatment of the topic.
Therefore, the impact of The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and several related legal issues have been omitted. It should be emphasized
that this is not an economic work. Rather, the purpose of this article is to introduce a fresh
twist to the study of foreign investment. See generally Fontheim & Gadbaw, Trade-Related
Investment Requirements in REGULATING THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 75 (B. Fisher &
J. Turner eds. 1983) for a discussion of trade-related requirements placed on foreign direct
investments by national governments and how they sometimes violate GATT provisions).
17. E. KAUFMAN, URUGUAY IN TRANSITION: FROM CIVILIAN TO MILITARY RULE 1 (1979).
Uruguay was known as the "Switzerland of South America" due to its collective executive
system. Id.
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.... ,' Being a small country, Uruguay's development is depen-
dent upon the world market.
The three main phases of economic development in Uruguay
up to 1985 can best be described in terms of the fiscal philosophy
of those in power at the time. The initial phase, spanning the years
1850 to 1930, was one of "outward development," an era of active
exporting and importing. Uruguay's early economic development
was heavily influenced by Western European ideas of capital, and
English investment in the country was substantially concentrated
in the financial and public sectors. 9 Development of the primary
sector, especially livestock production, was a major focus. After
World War I, both England and the United States invested in the
livestock sector. Foreign investment was at an all time high.20 As
exports increased and production grew, so did industrial product
imports.
The stock market crash of 1929 marked the introduction of
the second economic period. Battered about by poor world finan-
cial conditions, Uruguayan economists proposed and implemented
a program for the country that was a complete reversal of previous
developmental tactics. "Inward development" and "self-reliant
growth" became the predominant themes of the economic pro-
grams. United States investment in Uruguay increased in compari-
son to England, primarily in the manufacturing and financial sec-
tors.2' A decline in exports resulted in an inevitable reduction of
imports. Uruguay adopted a strategy of import substitution, and
during the 1930s and 1940s it appeared to be effective.22 However,
in the mid-50s, due primarily to the fall of international meat and
wool prices, economic stagnation set in.2 This stagnation remained
18. Id. at 15.
19. Melgar, supra note 9, at 27. English investors created the Banco Maua, Banco de
Londres and Banco Italiano and purchased the entire rail system in 1876.
20. Id. at 28.
21. Id.
22. M. FINCH, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URUGUAY SINCE 1870 220 (1981). The gross na-
tional product increased and the average standard of living was high. During this time, Uru-
guay had the highest per capita income of all the Latin-American countries. Id.
23. Id. at 223. Between 1945-50 the annual rate of growth of the total GDP was 5.4%.
The GDP per capita for the same period was 4.0%. Between 1965-70 the GDP was 2.2% and
the GDP per capita was a mere 0.9%. Id. The livestock and agricultural sector represented
20.4% of the total GDP for the years 1935-45. For those same years, manufacturing repre-
sented 17.5%, construction represented 3.4% and services represented 58.7%. For the years
1965-69 the percentages were 12.0, 25.6, 3.0 and 59.4 respectively. I. WONSEWER & J. YOUNG
CASARAVILLA, URUGUAY EN LA EcONOMIA MUNDIA 47 (1981). Inflation increased and the un-
employment rate escalated from 3.5% in 1957 to 10.0% in 1965. Id. at 51. Finally, while
19891
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a distinguishing feature of Uruguay's economy for the next twenty
years.24
In June 1973 the military took power by way of a coup
d'etat.25 Eliminating all opposition, the military government intro-
duced a neo-liberal economic planning model.2" Although this pe-
riod was characterized by constant change, some basic underlying
policies were evident .2 A clear preference for export production, in
terms of gearing the domestic market to the requirements imposed
by the international market upon the Uruguayan streams of inter-
national trade, was evident. Price restructuring, favoring exports
over internal consumption, was also employed. Private entrepre-
neurs and export production became the agents of economic
growth. An attempt was made to liberalize the economy in order to
increase its openness toward foreign capital. Foreign capital was
envisioned as an important key to future economic development in
Uruguay.
After employing this approach for two years, the government
was rewarded with some improvements in the economy. The gross
domestic product (GDP) grew, exports multiplied, and there was a
general increase in investment.28 Despite this initial positive result,
however, unemployment rose, income distribution differences grew
even more pronounced, the balance of payments deteriorated, the
country's foreign debt increased, and the livestock and agricultural
sector began to stagnate once again.29 Although the Foreign Invest-
ment Act allowed for huge inflows of foreign capital, the capital
that did enter Uruguay was mostly in the form of financial loans
rather than direct investment."0
Uruguay's exports accounted for 0.44% of the world market in 1950, by 1973 they repre-
sented only 0.06%. Diaz, La Historia Reciente (2), 388 BUSQUEDA 23 (June 25, 1987).
24. M. FINCH, supra note 22, at 220. As a result of the stagnation, income distribution
was adversely affected, especially in the rural labor sector. However, foreign investment
reached $172 million in 1961. Melgar, supra note 9, at 28.
25. E. KAUFMAN, supra note 17, at 1. This "autogolpe" or self-coup was a relatively slow
process compared with most military takeovers in Latin America. One-by-one the country's
institutions came under military domination. See McDonald, Confrontation and Transition
in Uruguay, 84 CURRENT HIST. 57 (1985).
26. L. FAROPPA, POLrlCAS PARA UNA EcONOMIA DESQUILIBRADA: URUGUAY 1958-1981 37,
56, 68 (1982). Some terminological and other considerations related to the type of economic
policy adopted by the militaries, may be seen in Diaz, El pasado reciente (3), 389 BUSQUEDA
2 (July 2, 1987).
27. L. FAROPPA, supra note 26, at 39-53.
28. M. FINCH, supra note 22, at 221.
29. L. FAROPPA, supra note 26, at 62-66.
30. Id. at 96-98. The only exception to this was investment in the seaside resort of
366 [Vol. 20:2
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In 1978 the struggle against inflation became top priority.
Growth and increased inflows of capital were no longer the focus of
economic strategies. The general "economic malaise of the country
prompted the military rulers to change their economic policies by
the late 1970s ... [in an effort] to reverse the generally negative
economic trends." ' The GDP increased, export and investment
expansion decreased, and private consumption declined as a result
of exchange rate regulation. 5 The devaluation of the Uruguayan
peso subjected import substitution industries to greater competi-
tion and export subsidies were cut. Interest rates escalated wildly,
retarding productive activities on the one hand, and aggravating
domestic debt on the other. These factors, coupled with the world
crisis, caused a contraction in exports and consequently in employ-
ment.3 The military was forced to restore civilian rule and to con-
duct, in 1984, the first national elections since 1971.1"
B. The current situation
President Sanguinetti took office on March 1, 1985.11 The mili-
tary dictatorship had so severely damaged the economy that the
country was virtually bankrupt. 6 Sanguinetti's administration im-
Punta del Este. According to information provided by the United Nations, gross inflows of
foreign direct investment to Uruguay in 1978 accounted for $129 million. By 1980 this figure
had reached $290 million. As a result, Uruguay became the fourth largest recipient of for-
eign direct investment, behind only Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. See U.N. CENTER ON
TRANSNAT'L CORP., TRENDS AND ISSUES IN FOREIGN DIREcT INVESTMENT AND RELATED ISSUES,
at 93, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/59, U.N. Sales No. E.78.II.A.15 (1985) [hereinafter UNCTC,
TRENDS AND ISSUES].
31. McDonald, supra note 25, at 58-59. The military renegotiated Uruguay's foreign
debt from a position of weakness.
32. Id. at 85-88.
33. The entrepreneurial sector debt trebled during the years 1978-82. CENTRO DE INVES-
TIGACIONES EcON6MICAS (CINVE), LA CRISIS URUGUAYA Y EL PROBLEMA NACIONAL 46 (1984).
The foreign debt increased to US $4.6 billion by the end of 1984. OFICINA DE PLANEAMIENTO
Y PRESUPUESTO, BALANCE DE LA SrUACION ECONOMICA EN LOS Dos ANOS DE REGIMEN
DEMOCRATICO 1 (1987). The GNP fell 16% and unemployment reached it highest rate in the
country's history between 1982 and 1985. Diaz, Ajuste externo y recuperacion real, 391
BUSQUEDA 2 (July 16, 1987).
34. McDonald, supra note 25, at 57. Poor economic conditions alone did not cause the
military to decide to relinquish their control. The military government had promised, from
the start, that civilian rule would be restored once conditions had stabilized. There was also
great dissension within the country that spurred the government to shift towards demo-
cratic rule. Id. at 59.
35. BACKGROUND NOTES, supra note 1, at 4. In 1984 President Sanguinetti, leader of the
Colorado Party, was elected for a five year term.




mediately took steps to halt the economic decline and shortly
thereafter initiated a phase of economic expansion.37 A decrease in
oil prices, a decrease in international interest rates, great demand
from Brazil for Uruguay's primary exports, the fall of the US dol-
lar in Europe and Japan, enhancement of the international prices
for the main Uruguayan products, and an increase in tourism all
played a part in the government's strategy. A strong policy of ex-
port promotion and greater participation in the world market have
helped to stabilize Uruguay's economy. Currently, economists pre-
dict a slowdown in the country's economic growth, mainly due to
the deterioration in external factors.
C. The economic problems: some issues
With a territory of approximately 187,000 square kilometers
and a population of a little less than 3 million people, Uruguay is a
small country. 9 There is always a danger of overproduction in a
country where both demand and consumption are low.40 Conse-
quently, it is often difficult for Uruguayan companies to reach a
point where economies of scale might play a role. As Uruguayan
manufacturers cannot rely exclusively on domestic consumption,
they must seek other markets for their products."' Domestic pro-
ducers, and therefore the entire economy, become dependent on
volatile world prices.
37. The GDP, following a decline of 17% between the years 1982-84, increased by 6.3%
in 1986. By 1986, exports had grown by 23% and unemployment had decreased to 10.3%.
OFICINA DE PLANEAMIENTO Y PRESUPUEsTO, supra note 9, at 4. The level of real wages in-
creased by four percent in 1986. Address by Ricardo Pascale, Academia Nacional de
Economia (May 19, 1987). A critical review of these figures may be found in G. AscE & D.
OLESKER, LAS TRANSNACIONALES Y EL CAPITALISMO URUGUAYO 93-104 (1987)).
38. 414 BUSQUEDA 16 (Dec. 23, 1987). Sanguinetti's party is seeking to attract new loans
and foreign investment. An "infusion of new capital, they believe, will rehabilitate and
streamline industries involved in the output of basic export commodities such as livestock
products, wool, textiles and leatherware - for which there has been a shrinking and increas-
ingly competitive world market since the mid-1950s." Chavkin, supra note 36, at 200.
39. A. MORRIS, supra note 7, at 151. See I. WONSEWER & J. YOUNG CASARAVILLA, supra
note 23, at 9-13 (discussion about the problems of a small nation).
40. The country's resource base is also very limited. Uruguay lacks such resources as
coal, petroleum and gas. A. MoRIs, supra note 7, at 151. However, they do have supplies of
iron ore, gold, manganese, copper, lead and zinc. WORLD OF INFORMATION, LATIN AMERICA &
CARIBBEAN REVIEW 1985, 143 (1985).
41. Veliz, Latin America's Opening to the Pacific in LATIN AMERICA AND WORLD ECON-
OMY: A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER 121 (J. Grunwald ed. 1978). "Agricultural exporters,
such as.. .Uruguay are naturally interested in discovering extra-Latin American markets
for their products. ... Id. at 124.
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Uruguay's entry into the world capitalist system began in the
late 19th century. Uruguay's role in the world market, at that time,
was basically as a supplier of raw materials and food products.
This trend has continued and the nation's economy fluctuates with
world demand of Uruguay's primary exports."' Dependence upon
world demand has tended to shape the Uruguayan economy and
its economic policies. The 1974 oil crisis and the fall of meat prices,
for example, prevented Uruguay from aggressively pursuing an ex-
pansion of their more competitive products.4
Uruguay's economy is also vulnerable to economic policy deci-
sions made by its closest neighbors, Argentina and Brazil. When
Brazil closed its market in 1987, for example, Uruguay felt the
sting in its export sector." This hyper-sensitivity to external con-
ditions results not only in lower prices for Uruguay's traditional
export products, but also greater difficulty in penetrating foreign
markets, especially the European Community and the Middle
East.'
The level of capital formation in the economy is inadequate.
During Sanguinetti's first year in office, gross investment ac-
counted for less than eight percent of the GDP. In contrast, the
consumption of capital was ten percent of the GDP. There was an
increase of gross investment during the following year, but it has
remained below ten percent. 6 Interest rates for the years 1978-
1982 were very high and thus discouraged productive investment.
It was much more profitable to invest the capital in the financial
sector. This preference for the financial sector, in combination with
the exchange rate policy alterations in November 1982, resulted in
heavy capital flight and an increase in the foreign debt. 7
With the establishment of the democratic government, the
42. L. MACADAR, URUGUAY 1974-1980: UN NUEVO ENSAYO DE REAJUSTE ECONoMICO 44-45
(1982).
43. CINVE, LA INDUSTRIA FRENTE A LA COMPETENCIA EXTRANJERA 31-32 (1987). See text
accompanying supra notes 38-44 (discussion of the historical fluctuations in Uruguayan
prices due to world demand).
44. CINVE, supra note 43, at 31.
45. See Vasallo, Uruguay: Deterioro del Sector Agropecuario, 303 PANORAMA ECONOM-
Ico LATINOAMERICANO 9-10 (1986).
46. Diaz, Los derechos de propiedad en crisis, 400 BUSQUEDA 2 (Sept. 17, 1987).
47. See CINVE, supra note 33, at 235. Private investors did not feel secure in the socio-
political environment and this also contributed to the capital flight. In many cases capital is
invested solely in foreign banks who in turn open accounts aboard. See generally de Melo &
Tybout, The Effects of Financial Liberalization on Savings and Investment in Uruguay, 34
ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 561 (1986).
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right to strike was restored. Critics have argued that strikes have
had the effect of discouraging both domestic and foreign invest-
ment."' The decrease in investment level has also been attributed
to certain recently enacted statutes that provide a debt morato-
rium and suspend the performance of other credit rights."9
Uruguay has "a vast agricultural resource in the soil of the
Pampas, but this wealth has yet to be properly tapped . ..."50
Uruguay's livestock and agricultural sector has been stagnant now
for more than forty years6 1 This condition has been characterized
as a "dynamic stagnation." The sector is seen as stagnating be-
cause growth in the sector is clearly insufficient, yet dynamic be-
cause some changes in the form of production have taken place.2
One of the factors that has affected and still affects the live-
stock and agricultural sector is its dependence upon the world
market. But it is believed generally that the stagnation is due to a
technological deficiency rather than a purely economic stagnation.
Growth of this sector through increased use of Uruguay's natural
resources is impossible. All of Uruguay's arable land is, and has
been since the beginning of the century, under production. There-
fore, increased productivity can only take place through the intro-
duction of new technology. 3 Uruguay experiences significant mi-
gration from rural to urban areas and therefore stagnation in this
sector leads to instability of the rural infrastructure."'
At the end of 1986, Uruguay's gross foreign debt amounted to
US$ 5.2 billion or US$ 1,700 per capita. 5 Despite Uruguay's punc-
tuality in meeting its debt service obligations, the issue of whether
the foreign debt should be paid at all is heatedly debated in Uru-
48. See BUSQUEDA, supra note 38, at 20.
49. Diaz, supra note 46, at 2.
50. A. MoRRIs, supra note 7, at 151. Agriculture in Uruguay is largely devoted to live-
stock production rather than to crops. Id. Approximately 10-12% of the total country is
cultivated arable land and 70-75% pasture land. WORLD OF INFORMATION, supra note 40, at
143.
51. Alonso & Perez Arrarte, Adopcion de Tecnologia en la Ganaderia Vacuna
Uruguaya, in EL PROBLEMA TECNOLOGICO DEL URUGUAY AcTuAL 285 (CINVE & CIESU eds.
1981).
52. Barbato de Silva, El Proceso de Generacion, Difusion y Adopcion de Tecnologia en
la Ganaderia Vacuna Uruguaya, in EL PROBLEMA TECNOLOGICO DEL URUGUAY ACTUAL 242
(CINVE & CIESU eds. 1981).
53. CINVE, supra note 33, at 115, 123.
54. See Vina, Indicadores Sociales del Uruguay, 25 PUBLICACION DEL CENTRO LATI-
NOAMERICANO DE ECONOMIA HUMANA 53, 58 (1983).
55. See Diaz, La deuda externa, 397 BUSQUEDA 2 (Aug. 27, 1987).
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guay.5 Although foreign debt is not considered the main "prob-
lem" of the country, debt-servicing is a significant burden.
The country has been afflicted with a public sector deficit for
decades. Although the deficit has been reduced, it accounted for
4.9% of the GDP in 1986.51 Public enterprises have generated sub-
stantial losses.58 The few public enterprises in Uruguay are consid-
ered inefficient, a source of capital drain, and in dire need of
change. Several options, including privatization, joint venture be-
tween private and public capital, and internal restructuring have
been suggested. 9
Tourism is also an important source of revenue, yet Uruguay
lacks a major tourist infrastructure.60 Uruguay's seaside resorts at-
tract numerous visitors each year but generally only do a healthy
business in the summer months.6' Tourism is limited by the lack of
facilities.62 In addition, most of the tourists that do bask on Uru-
guayan beaches are Argentinian and Brazilian. This in itself is no
cause for concern, but there might be a tendency to link the suc-
cess of Uruguay's tourism sector to the health of these two coun-
tries' economies.
The mining sector also deserves attention. Uruguay has no pe-
56. See Chavkin, supra note 36, at 201. Protests by Uruguayans against the foreign
debt have intensified. Many of the buildings in the center of Montevideo, the capital of
Uruguay, are covered with posters declaring, "Save our Country, Do not pay the Foreign
Debt." Id.
57. OFICINA DE PLANEAMIENTO Y PRnsuPusTo, supra note 9, at 4.
58. Interview with Ariel Davrieux, Director of the Secretariat of Planning and Budget,
in Montevideo, Uruguay, 3 PuNTO Y APARTE 45 (Sept. 1987). The electricity company and
the telephone company are examples of public enterprises.
59. See, e.g., Batalla, Reflexiones Sobre el Estado y la Modernizacion, 2 PUNTO Y
APARTE 87 (Aug. 1987).
60. A. MORRIS, supra note 7, at 157. Uruguay now earns over 10% of her foreign ex-
change from tourists.
61. As Uruguay is geographically located below the Equator, January and February are
the summer months.
62. Development of a hotel infrastructure is under consideration. U.N. CENTER ON
TRANSNAT'L CORP., TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL TOURISM at 2, 57 U.N.
Doc. ST/CTC/18, U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.A.9 (1982) [hereinafter UNCTC TRANSNAT'L CORP.
IN INT'L TOURISM). As to the development of a hotel infrastructure, under the Uruguayan
debt-equity program, two investment projects involving the construction of a five star hotel
in Montevideo were submitted for consideration by the Secretariat of Planning and Budget.
See 428 BUSQUESDA 18 (Apr. 7, 1988).
63. A. MORRIS, supra note 7, at 157. There are plans to construct bridges between Ar-
gentina and Uruguay and to improve roads to Brazil in an effort to increase the flow of
tourists from these neighbors. Id. It is estimated that over 1.1 million visitors come to Uru-




troleum, but has abundant resourses in non-metallic minerals. In
order for the country to fully exploit these resources, new
technololgy must first be introduced."' Transnational corporations
could theoretically make significant contributions to this sector
through the transfer of skills, knowledge of products and produc-
tion techniques.
III. URUGUAY'S CONDITION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT
What impact will foreign investment have upon the problems
and needs discussed in the previous section? Will foreign invest-
ment alleviate any of those problems? No easy solutions exist. Ob-
viously, foreign investment will not bring instant wealth nor will it
by itself substantially improve the country's economic condition.
Foreign investment is just one way to influence the economic
health of Uruguay. The desired economic development will not re-
sult exclusively by relying on only one tool, but by implementing a
comprehensive program that includes many different strategies.
A. Size of the market and foreign investment
Uruguay must strive to minimize the drawbacks of the small
marketplace by actively pursuing new export markets.6 5 The local
market has a natural ceiling and once reached, cannot absorb any
increase in production. Therefore, if the economy is to grow, new
outlets must be found for increased production. An export promo-
tion policy would be one way to create outlets. President
Sanguinetti's administration is currently employing this type of
strategy. Serious efforts are being made to strengthen trade inte-
gration with both Argentina and Brazil.6 In addition, the current
64. See D. ASTORI, R. ZERBINO, J. RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ & A. TISNES, supra note 9, at 51.
65. See Diaz & Helleiner, Developing Countries and Reform of the World Trading Sys-
tem in THE NEW PROTECTIONIST THREAT TO WORLD WELFARE 505-25 (D. Salvatore ed. 1987).
[Less Developed Country's (LDC)] export earnings are ... the means to obtain,
typically from industrialized countries, key development inputs that would be
very expensive to produce at home. Expanding export earnings are also crucial
for the smooth management of LDC external debt and for the attraction of fresh
foreign loans and investments . . . [E]xports are also major determinants of
their capacity to import and, consequently, to grow."
Id. at 509.
66. See generally French-Davis, The Andean Pact: A Model of Economic Integration
for Developing Countries in LATIN AMERICA AND WORLD ECONOMY: A CHANGING INTERNA-
TIONAL ORDER, 165 (J. Grunwald ed. 1978). Regional integration consists of a group of coun-
tries joining forces to expand their export markets and "to take full ... advantage of the
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administration is aggressively searching for new markets in which
to compete. 7
The impact of transnational corporations on developing coun-
tries' exports is not easy to ascertain. Some reports suggest that
transnational corporations impact only slightly on developing
economies, while others describe a substantial contribution." How-
ever, it is apparent that co-production, one of the forms that ex-
ports may take, is growing. In 1981, co-production accounted for
fifteen percent of United States imports of manufactures; twenty-
two percent of those from developing countries. 9 The trend is also
transideological, inasmuch as socialist countries are promoting ex-
port assembly operations within their borders.70
Transnational corporations generally establish themselves in
the most industrialized countries of the target region. Argentina
and Brazil are natural milieus for such investment. Prior to any
investment, however, the transnational corporations examine the
risk involved and the stability of the target country. Uruguay is
considered one of the more stable nations in the region. It is more
politically stable than Argentina and has greater economic sound-
ness than Brazil.71
There are side effects to transnational corporation involve-
ment in the export markets. Once transnational corporations get
involved in production within the country, the assembly produc-
tion sometimes evolves into an enclave of foreign interests. Often
international division of labor." Id. at 165-66. This type of arrangement is clearly the "most
realistic option for small countries, given their need to export and to overcome the practical
difficulties of obtaining ready access to world markets." Id. at 166-67. Argentina is a mem-
ber of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) which links seventeen South and
Central American countries.
Efforts to achieve a regional free trade area have been dropped in favor of a
system of a bilateral tariff preference agreement between each pair of member
countries. Tariff concessions are arranged in accordance with a hierarchy of
more developed, less developed and least developed countries. Uruguay is con-
sidered one of the less developed countries.
DUN'S MARKETING SERVICES, supra note 8, at 1383.
67. See Ferrere, The Uruguayan-Argentinean Trade Co-Operation Agreement, 18 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 320 (1984)(discussion of the trade regime established between Argentina
and Uruguay).
68. See Bennett & Sharpe, La Industria Automotriz Mexicana y la Politica Economica
de la Promocion de Exportaciones. Algunos Problemas del Control Estatal de las Em-
presas Transnacionales, in 2 INDUSTRIALIZACION E INTERNACIONALIZACION EN LA AMERICA LA-
TINA 208 (F. Fajnzylber ed. 1981).
69. THE GLOBAL FACTORY 7 (J. Grunwald & K. Flamm eds. 1985).
70. Id. at 229.
71. The Miami Herald, Apr. 17, 1989, Business Monday, at 27.
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the host country's other enterprises are alienated in the process.
Although this has been the case in Mexico, it is not the general
tendency.7" As a rule, links between transnational corporations and
the rest of the economy have been stronger than the critics ac-
knowledge. 73 Co-production has also tended to create an industrial
structure that is dependent on demands and markets entirely for-
eign and over which the host country has no control. But this is
applicable to every type of export, and evidence shows that reces-
sions in the United States had only small negative effects on as-
sembly production abroad.74 Despite the debate, assembly produc-
tion is more likely to generate employment, create income, and
improve the balance of payments of the host country.76
Exports, both to neighbors and other industrialized countries,
are a way of resolving market size problems. Foreign investment
may accomplish positive results. It must be emphasized that the
principles discussed above apply only to the manufacturing sector.
The manufacturing and services sectors in developing countries
generally receive the greatest influx of foreign investment.76 These
sectors are highly labor intensive, at least in some of the produc-
tion stages, and due to an abundance of labor in the country, Uru-
guay will achieve somewhat of a competitive advantage. Uruguay's
major exports currently are agricultural goods, fertilizers, textiles,
consumer goods and machinery.77
B. Dependency upon foreign factors and foreign investment
The plunge in international prices of Uruguay's traditional ex-
port products, and the closing of several markets due to protec-
tionist measures created serious problems for the country. Trans-
national corporations obviously cannot solve the international
price puzzle, but they may be able to make foreign markets more
accessible to the Uruguayan manufacturer.
First, foreign subsidiaries have greater access to market infor-
mation, distribution channels, and international marketing skills
than do domestic firms in developing countries. Transnational cor-
72. THE GLOBAL FACTORY, supra note 69, at 228, 232.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 233-34.
75. Id. at 226-28.
76. See UNCTC, TRENDS AND ISSUES, supra note 30, at 28.
77. DUN'S MARKETING SERVICES, supra note 8, at 1381.
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porations generally form part of a multinational group or network
of affiliates which, operating with varying degrees of interrelation-
ship, have greater expertise and broader exposure to worldwide
competitive markets. This advantage is directly proportional to the
height of the marketing entry barrier of the product.7"
Second, the United States, a country that receives large
amounts of Latin American exports each year, has a tariff system
in force that permits the duty free re-entry of components sent
abroad for processing or assembly.' Transnational corporations
are in the best position to take advantage of this system. By the
same token, transnational corporations may begin demanding such
concessions from other countries and may attempt to prevent the
introduction of non-tariff barriers and increasingly high tariff
rates.8 0
C. Lack of investment and foreign investment
Proponents of foreign investment argue that transnational cor-
porations could provide Uruguay with much needed capital. How-
ever, actual capital contribution by transnational corporations may
not be as large as one would imagine. Investment contribution
could be small where a transnational corporation operates with ex-
tensive credit and relatively little capital. The infusion of capital in
the form of direct investment corresponds to the stages in which
78. De la Torre, Foreign Investment and Export Dependency, 23 ECON. DEV. & Soc.
CHANGE, 133, 137, 140 (1974-75).
79. Tariff item #806.30 provides:
Any article of metal . . . manufactured in the United States or subjected to a
process of manufacture in the United States, if exported for further processing,
and if the exported article as processed outside the United States, or the article
which results from the processing . . . is returned to the United States for fur-
ther processing. . . [shall have a duty] imposed upon the value of such process-
ing outside the United States rather than the entire article.
The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1202 (1930).
In addition, tariff item #807.000 provides:
Articles assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated components, the
product of the United States, which (a) were exported in condition ready for
assembly without further fabrication, (b) have not lost their physical identity in
such articles by change in form . . . and (c) have not been advanced in value or
improved in condition abroad except by being assembled. . . [shall have a duty]
upon the full value of the imported article, less the cost or value of such prod-
ucts of the United States.
Id.
80. Helleiner, Manufactured Exports from Less-Developed Countries and Multina-
tional Firms, 83 ECON. J. 21, 32 (1973).
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
the plant is settled. Further expansion is defrayed with generated
earnings and local resources.8 1 The privileged position of transna-
tional corporations enables them to gear themselves, to a great ex-
tent, toward locally borrowed savings.
Even where the direct capital contribution of a parent firm is
not in the form of cash but in the form of capital goods or capital-
ized intangibles,8 2 these payments in kind may be subject to arbi-
trary valuation. 3 It must be kept in mind that in terms of real
capital flow84 between Latin America and the United States, Latin
America has always been in a negative position. Profits remitted in
the past have exceeded fresh capital.8 5 In light of the political in-
stability in Latin America during the 1960s and 70s and the effect
of that instability on foreign investment, it is unlikely that trans-
national corporations will actively pursue projects requiring signifi-
cant amounts of capital. Instead, they might prefer forms of in-
vestment which require only minor infusions of capital.
Assuming that foreign investment might indicate an increase
in the flow of important capital, this alone is not enough to suggest
an alternative foreign investment policy. A plan that would routin-
ize the manner of allocation and identification of sectors in need of
funds is desperately needed. However, the welfare effect of addi-
tional capital is not independent of that capital's allocation. Negli-
gently allocated capital could adversely affect the country's wel-
fare.88 A more efficient approach would be to identify specific
sectors or problems that would benefit most from foreign invest-
ment and provide the greatest incentives for investment in those
areas.
81. Fajnzylber, Las Empresas Transnacionales y el Sistema Industrial de Mexico, in 1
INDUSTRIALIZACION E INTERNACIONALIZACION EN LA AMERICA LATINA 498 (F. Fajnzylber ed.
1980).
82. For example, company know-how or a company brand-name would be viewed as a
capital intangible.
83. S. LALL, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 28 (1967) (Com-
monwealth Economic Paper No. 5).
84. Capital flow can be viewed as new capital from the United States less remittance of
profits to the United States.
85. Bitar, La Inversion Extranjera en America Latina, in EL PERU FRENTE AL CAPITAL
EXTRANJERo; DEUDA E INVERSION 90 (E. Ferrero Costa ed. 1985).
86. Diaz-Alejandro, Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CORPORATION 325 (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
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D. Livestock and agricultural sector stagnation and foreign
investment
The livestock and agricultural sector are in dire need of tech-
nological change. A common basis for success in achieving rapid
growth in livestock and agriculture productivity is the capacity to
generate ecologically adapted and economically viable technology. 7
Transfer of technology is one way to achieve efficiency in this
sector. The process involves adapting imported technology to the
specific environmental conditions and the various ecological re-
gions of the country. It is crucial that developing nations either
generate their own technology, or at least assist in its development.
Implementation problems would be alleviated considerably if
knowledge of social and economic conditions within the country
were considered during all of the developmental phases.88 In most
countries where rapid rates of technical progress have been seen in
the livestock and agricultural sector, "socialization" of the research
has been deliberately employed as an instrument of moderniza-
tion.89 The most successful experiments in introducing technology
into developing countries have always included a process by which
institutional innovations, such as the provision of publicly sup-
ported agricultural education and research systems, were devel-
oped to facilitate technological changes.90
Foreign investment alone appears to have little to contribute
in solving the livestock and agricultural sector stagnation problem.
Although some technology will naturally accompany the introduc-
tion of foreign investment, it would only bring short-term relief.
One way to achieve long-term gains would be to develop national
research systems that would strive to adapt foreign technology to
Uruguay's particular needs.
E. Foreign debt and foreign investment
One could argue that foreign investment is the solution to
Uruguay's debt crisis. By encouraging foreign investment the coun-
87. See generally Y. HAYAMI & V. RUTTAN, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, AN INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 1985).
88. See U.N. CENTER ON TRANSNAT'L CORP., TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE AGRI-
CULTURAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY, at 103, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/24, U.N. Sales
No. E.83.II.A.4 (1983)(discussion on agricultural machinery).
89. Id.
90. Y. HAYAMI & V. RUTTAN, supra note 87, at 87, 250.
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try would experience an influx of hard currency that could be used
to ease the debt burden. But it is unclear whether foreign invest-
ment would result in a problem-free infusion of fresh capital into
the economy or merely add to the existing dilemma.
The debt-to-equity swap"t has been hailed by some as the so-
lution to the foreign debt crisis. The formula seems designed to
please everyone.92 In general terms, creditors unload doubtful
loans, investors gain easy access to interesting assets, and the
debtor countries rid themselves of part of their external debt.93
From the debtor countries' perspective, debt-to-equity swaps can
serve to reduce both outstanding debt and annual debt service bur-
dens, encourage equity investment flows over and above those
which the country would otherwise obtain, and function as a mech-
anism for the repatriation of flight capital. In addition, debt-to-
equity swaps may be seen, in certain circumstances, as facilitating
the move towards privatization of public enterprises. 4
On December 30, 1987, the Uruguayan Executive Power en-
acted a debt-to-equity swap program.9 Throughout Latin America,
approximately US$ 5 billion has been swapped for equity since
1982, slightly more than one percent of the region's total debt.90 A
91. Recent Development, International Debt: Debt-to-Equity Swaps, 28 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 507 (1987) (authored by Tina Hofmann)[hereinafter Recent Development, Interna-
tional Debt]. A foreign company proposes a debt-to-equity transaction to the government of
the debtor country. Once the government approves the proposal, the company purchases
foreign-currency-denominated debt for the country through an intermediary bank in the
international debt market. The company may acquire these debt instruments at a substan-
tial discount, perhaps 60-70% of face value. The company then presents the instrument to
the central bank of the debtor country for redemption in local currency converted at the
official exchange rate. The amount of domestic currency obtained will be greater than the
amount the company paid for the original debt instrument; in some instances, as much as
face value. The debtor country officially retires the debt and the company uses the local
currency to make an equity investment in the country.
92. Bucheit, Converting Sovereign Debt into Equity Investments, INr'L FIN. L. REv.,
Sept. 1986, at 10. The debt-to-equity swap program has been labelled "universal happiness"
by those who have employed it.
93. Debt-for-Equity Avenue under Review, LATIN AM. WEEKLY REP., at 6-7 (Aug. 1987)
[hereinafter LATIN Am. WEEKLY REP.]).
94. Address by J. de la Chauviniere, Vice President of Bank of America, Pan American
Society (Nov. 23, 1987). But see Recent Development, International Debt, supra note 91, at
512, 515. Some critics argue that the money would probably have been invested even in the
absence of the debt-to-equity schemes. They point out that by allowing debt-to-equity
swaps, governments needlessly prepay outstanding debt and allow the investor, rather than
the country, to take advantage of the discounts. Moreover, issuance of domestic currency
may trigger inflationary pressures.
95. Discussed infra text accompanying notes 128-132.
96. LATIN Am. WEEKLY REP., supra note 93, at 7. Chile has been most successful, con-
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debt-equity swap can be an extremely useful tool, however, it must
be used in conjunction with other economic policies aimed at Uru-
guay's debt problems.' 7 The sheer volume of the debt and strong
resistance by foreign banks to swap proposals that involve capital
loss and exchange of fixed-income instruments for high risk securi-
ties suggests that debt-equity swaps will have only a marginal im-
pact. The market for Latin American debt is not large. Any in-
crease in demand for these debt instruments may reduce the
discounts at which they sell, thereby diminishing the attractiveness
of swaps to potential investors.""
F. Public enterprises' deficit and foreign investment
Arguments about the potential role of foreign investment in
public enterprises are encompassed in a broader discussion: the
privatization of state-owned enterprises. The subject is argued
heatedly in Uruguay and it has received endless attention by aca-
demicians.9 Before the country turns to transnational corporations
as a solution to the public enterprise dilemma, the cause of public
enterprise undercapitalization should be determined. Does the
problem arise as a result of ownership of the enterprises? Or does
it arise as a result of market conditions? It has been suggested that
the economic performance of these enterprises depends much more
on competition and regulatory policy than on ownership per se. 100
All of these factors fail to address the ideological issues at stake.
Joint ventures between public local enterprises and foreign
corporations have been most widespread in Brazil and Mexico.
These projects have concentrated mainly in the petrochemical,
verting close to one tenth of its debt.
97. M. Otero, Foreign Debt Equity Swaps, Chilean Experience 48 (1987) (unpublished
manuscript).
98. U.N. CENTER ON TRANSNAT'L CORP., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA;
RECENT TRENDS, PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES, at 20-21, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/3, U.N.
Sales No. E.86.II.A.14 (1986). How should one evaluate the success of a debt-equity
formula? Some part of the external debt may be reduced, but the debtor country has to
reimburse the investor and such payment may create inflation. The issue of attribution re-
mains to be answered. It is argued that the Chilean debt-to-equity program is successful, in
the sense that part of the debt was canceled and investments were attracted. The question
remains to be answered whether the attraction of foreign investment is due to the debt-
equity system or to the apogee of Chilean exports.
99. See, e.g., R. VERNON & Y. AHARONI, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN THE WESTERN
ECONOMIES (1981) (bibliography).
100. Yarrow, Privatization in Theory and Practice, 2 EcON. POL'Y 324, 325 (1986).
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steel and telecommunications industries.101 Transnational corpora-
tions may provide important technological know-how and engi-
neering, technical training, continued technical inputs, and special-
ized management. 102 Argentina, on the other hand, shows limited
public enterprise-transnational corporation association.103 There-
fore, any participation in a joint venture between a Uruguayan
public enterprise and a transnational corporation should only be
pursued in the highly capital-intensive industries.
IV. THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN URUGUAY
A. The current system: an overview
Uruguay has a tradition of "respecting foreign capital and
honouring its international commitments . ,,*"104 However, prior
to the enactment in 1974 of the Foreign Investment Act, there was
no general discipline regulating foreign investment in Uruguay.0 '
The Foreign Investment Act was developed so that the country
would finally have a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of
foreign investment. The Act was designed to conform with existing
economic policies and recognized that foreign investment was a
necessary requirement for the development of the national
economy. 106
The Act's major renovation was to offer a guarantee that an-
nual profits would be freely remitted and that capital could be re-
patriated with ease. Authorities can deny the investor the protec-
tion of the Act if the investment does not promote national
interests or contribute sufficiently to economic development
goals. 10 7 In addition, the use of medium and long-term internal
101. See generally P. GHOSH, DEVELOPING LATIN AMERICA: A MODERNIZATION PERSPEC-
TIVE (1984).
102. U.N. CENTER TRANSNAT'L CORP., ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN JOINT VENTURE PART-
NERS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at 9, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.B/2 (1987).
103. E. WHITE, JOINT VENTURES OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN ARGENTINA WITH OTHER DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 51 (1984).
104. Uruguay: A Tradition of Freedom, EUROMONEY 2 (Supp. 1989). Richard Zerbino,
Minister of Economy and Finance is happy to report that Uruguay has never confiscated
any foreign capital. Id.
105. See N. RODRIGUEZ OLIVERA, LA LEY DR INVERsiONES EXTRANJERAS 26-29 (1974).
There were only some statutes reserving certain sectors of the economy to national capital,
and also regulations of the Central Bank regarding the remittance of profits.
106. Report of the Executive Power to the State Council, in Diario de Sesiones del
Consejo de Estado, No. 19.253, Mar. 19, 1974, at 150.
107. DUN'S MARKETING SERVICES, supra note 8, at 1385. This investment law "guaran-
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credit was banned.10 8
There are many other regulations that govern foreign invest-
ment in Uruguay. For example, public water services and drainage
works, railroads, alcohol and petroleum refineries, electricity and
telephone, mail, and port facilities are reserved by statute to the
public sector.10 9 Activities such as broadcasting and mining explo-
ration are reserved exclusively to nationals." 0
The Act also provides that "foreign investment will be subject
to the national regime." ' Any dispute arising under the Act will
be settled in national courts and under Uruguayan law." 2 Several
other norms complete the juridical regime of foreign investment in
Uruguay. "  Of special importance are the Free Zones Act (FZA)1 14
and the Debt-to-Equity Swaps Decree (DESD),11 5 both enacted in
December of 1987.
B. Some comments on the Foreign Investment Act
It is unlikely, in view of the liberalization of the exchange
tees the convertibility and remittance of profits and invested capital, within the terms fixed
by the investment contract." Id.
108. Statute No. 14.179, supra note 8, at art. 11. It is important to note that the statute
provided a "right" and not an obligation to comply with its terms. An investor was not
compelled to subject himself to the regime but if he desired to take advantage of the guar-
antee of convertibility and remittance of profits, he or she had to comply with the Foreign
Investment Act regulations. See J. ZaRBINO CAVAJANI, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: URU-
GUAY'S EXPERIENCE 11 (1981). The investor could, however, opt not to comply with the For-
eign Investment Act procedures and the remittance of profits would lose the guarantee.
Shortly after the Act went into effect, the exchange market was liberalized. The guarantee
of the Act was, therefore, no longer necessary. The foreign investor may now either apply for
the "guarantee" of the Act, or may invest without doing so. In either case the remittance of
profits will be liberal. Due to this development, the Act has been rendered essentially
meaningless.
109. See COMCORDE, DOING BusiNEss IN URUGUAY 30 (1980).
110. N. RODRIGUEZ OLIVERA, supra note 105, at 109-14.
111. Statute No. 14.179, supra note 8, at art. 15.
112. Id. at art. 35.
113. The Industrial and Investment Agreement between Uruguay and the Republic of
Paraguay, signed in 1978, establishes broad provisions in terms of the promotion of foreign
investment. Statute No. 14.535. The Investment Incentives Agreement with the United
States, entered into in 1983 relates to the insurance mechanism of foreign investment under
the Overseas Private Investment Company (OPIC) and the disputes settlement. Statute No.
15.427. The Industrial Promotion Act, Statute No. 14.178 (1974) provides several tax and
credit benefits with regard to the activities that the Act defines as "of national interest."
The benefits of the Industrial Promotion Act are cumulative to those provided by the For-
eign Investment Act. See also N. RODRIGUEZ OLIVERA, supra note 105, at 101.
114. Statute No. 15.921, D.O. (Uru. Jan. 26, 1988).
115. Decree 797/987, D.O. (Uru. Apr. 13, 1988).
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market, that a foreign investor will apply for the protection of the
Foreign Investment Act." 6 The benefits of the Act are now virtu-
ally non-existent. An investor can attain equivalent benefits with-
out complying with the Act's convoluted and complex procedural
regulations. In addition, the Foreign Investment Act fails to incor-
porate the foreign investment benefits available under the Indus-
trial Promotion Act. If benefits are offered to the foreign investor,
it would be logical to include those incentives in the Foreign In-
vestment Act as that is most likely the legislation that an investor
will review prior to making any investment decisions.
Capital allocation is the weakest link of the foreign investment
scenario. Trying to determine which investments should be pur-
sued will depend on compatibility with national interests.
Problems arise due to a lack of a clear definition of what the "na-
tional interest" is.117
One area of concern is the amount of discretion granted to the
Executive Power in awarding authorization for foreign investment.
The system could get the reputation of being arbitrary and unfair
if this power is not used carefully. Another worry is that the for-
eign investment legislation be clear and concise. Foreign investors,
prior to making any investment decision, tend to examine the tar-
get country's foreign investment legislation for clarity and predict-
ability. If the law cannot be understood, it is likely that the inves-
tor will elect not to invest in that country. In addition, the fact
that there are no sectoral priorities delineated in the Act is cause
for alarm. Capital investment must be encouraged in certain desir-
able sectors and discouraged in sectors that are considered too sen-
sitive to huge influxes of foreign capital. Without a guiding hand
from the legislators, any influx of foreign capital could turn out to
be a detriment to the country's development rather than a boon.
The foreign investment system is implemented in a disjointed
and spotty fashion. The Foreign Investment Advisory Unit initially
screens every project. Once the project has received preliminary
approval, however, the Economy and Finance Ministry Depart-
ment supervises the actual investment. 18 There is obviously a lack
of centralization. The two departments view the problem, not as a
116. Uruguay: A Tradition of Freedom, supra note 104, at 2.
117. In fact, the determination will be made pursuant to the more specific criteria pro-
vided in the Industrial Promotion Act, supra note 113, at §4.
118. Statute No. 14,179, supra note 8.
[Vol. 20:2
1989] FOREIGN INVESTMENT 383
whole, but as disembodied sections." 9
C. The Free Zones Act of 198720
On December 10, 1987, the Uruguayan Parliament enacted the
Free Zones Act (FZA).'2 1 The stated objectives of the FZA were
"promoting investments, expanding exports, increasing employ-
ment, and encouraging the international economic integration. 1 22
The underlying philosophy of the FZA is the creation of an "indus-
trial estate.112' The hopes are that this "will generate new sources
of employment, attract investments, increase our exports and in-
troduce new technologies." 2" The goals of the FZA are admirable;
however, there are some concerns that should be reviewed.
First, although the Parliamentary discussions regarding the
FZA frequently alluded to the fact that the zones would attract
investment and expand exports, how the zones would achieve such
potential was never clearly articulated. The Legislative Power
stressed the domestic side; the benefits that the zones may offer in
terms of low wages and tax exemptions. It did not, however, suffi-
ciently consider the international side effects: the international re-
organization of the division of labor through the patterns of foreign
assembly. 2 '
119. See S. LALL, supra note 83, at 57.
120. For the preparation of this section, I benefited from conversations with Jose
Amado.
121. Statute No. 15.921, supra note 114.
122. Id. at art.1. Free industrial zones "offer important tax and regulatory benefits not
found in regular commercial activities -goods can: move in or out without duty; be com-
bined with others to form products that are not taxed as finished goods; be displayed for
sale, or simply stored for future use; be imported, used to make something else, then be
exported without tax levies." Meissner, Mexican Border and Free Zone Areas: Implications
for Development in U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN TRADE RELATIONS - ISSUES AND CONCERNS 258-59
(M. Czinkota ed. 1983). In 1980 there were approximately 350 free trade zones in the world.
Id. The zones were created in order to promote ideas of developing industrial, commercial,
and service activities.
123. Exposition of Motives by the Representatives Elias Porras and Ruben Frey, in
Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Representantes, No. 1.936, t.628, May 21, 1987, at 280
[hereinafter Diario de Sesiones].
124. Executive Power's Message accompanying the proposal of the statute submitted to
the Parliament (published in Diario de Sesiones, supra note 123, at 291).
125. Industrialized countries are facing increasing competition and in order to keep
whatever competitive edge they might have, they must search for ways to transfer part of
their production process to countries where costs are lower. This transfer is accomplished by
two different means: intra-firm trade (or vertical integration) and international subcontract-
ing. This phenomenon of co-production is the leading cause of the growing expansion of
export processing zones in the world.
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Secondly, the improvements introduced by the FZA relative to
previous free zone legislation'2 6 are not clear. While previous acts
allowed for processing and industrialization activities, the FZA
presupposes the building of a whole new infrastructure. 2 7 Thus,
the FZA corresponds to the modern concept of free industrial
zones. The old system did not yield substantial results. To what
degree will the innovations of the current regime produce the ex-
pected benefits? Does the statute constitute a strong enough basis
to achieve significant results? Free industrial zones are not a pan-
acea. They are yet another useful tool in the battle for
development.
D. The Debt-to-Equity Swaps Decree
On December 30, 1987, the Executive Power enacted the
Debt-to-Equity Swaps Decree (DESD). 2 s It was implemented
shortly thereafter by a Central Bank Regulation of January 13,
1988.
Foreigners and nationals are eligible to apply to the debt-to-
equity program established by the DESD. The convertible debt
corresponds to the advances effectively made under the terms of
the Multi-Year Restructuring Agreement (MYRA). It has been de-
termined that this debt amounts to sixty percent of the total exter-
The "expansion of free industrial zones in third world countries is somehow a by-prod-
uct of this changing international specialization where comparative advantages in costs of
production are being exploited, accentuated or created by these countries, and where trans-
national corporations are willing to participate and benefit from the new trends in interna-
tional trade and manufacturing". J. Amado, Free Industrial Zones Revisited: A Legal and
Developmental Approach 24 (1988)(unpublished manuscript). The Free Zones Act is
designed to respond to this phenomenon. Consequently, the question becomes whether the
Free Zones Act provides the optimal instrument in the changing context of international
trade.
126. See Brause & Shaw, Puertos Francos, Zonas Francas y Depositos Francos, 6
RviSTA TREBUTARIA 383, 506-527 (1979).
127. J. Amado, supra note 125, at 49. Perhaps the most important difference is the
omission in the current regulation of the former restriction of authorizing the establishment
of factories in the zones only when there were no domestic factories with sufficient export
capacity. Id. A sub-zone is an area that is accessible to only one firm. That firm has the
authority to designate which part of its facilities will be incorporated into the zone. Al-
though control by the government is a disadvantage, it has a crucial advantage over the
classical free industrial zone in that it does not imply any infrastructure costs. The Free
Zone Act of 1987 does not distinguish between intra-firm trade and subcontracting. The Act
completely disregards the fact that subcontracting offers the possibility of a stimulation of
local entrepreneurs to participate in outward-oriented industries. On top of that, it contains
no provisions that address the subject of previously implemented sub-zones. Id.
128. Decree 797/987, supra note 115.
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nal debt of the public sector (the private debt cannot be con-
verted).' Eligible investments must be aimed at acquiring new
equipment, industrial plants or other facilities, as well as incorpo-
rating other assets necessary for an increase in goods and service
production. Priority should be given to projects that are oriented
towards exports and the tourism infrastructure.
In general terms, the system is adequate. It is clear and simple
to understand. 30 However, the decree treats all projects equally;
there is no evaluative process for the different kinds of invest-
ments. A system that provides either ranging levels of discounts'
or a variable fee subject to the priority of the investment, 32 might
be more appropriate. As a result, projects that are considered more
favorable do not receive any special incentives. The FZA should
have addressed this concern.
E. General considerations
Uruguay's foreign investment legislation is very scattered. It is
composed of the Foreign Investment Act of 1974, a Free Zones Act,
a Debt-to-Equity Swap Decree, several treaties and statutes grant-
ing tax and credit incentives; but none of them make reference to
any other. There is also an important disparity between the in-
tended effect of the regulation and reality.
It is possible to invest in Uruguay using the local credit and
remitting profits freely, but the Foreign Investment Act bans the
repatriation of capital until a certain date from the initial invest-
ment, limits the access to domestic credit, and entails bureaucratic
costs. This creates a paradox since the goal of the current adminis-
129. Olivera Garcia, Deuda Externa: El Regimen de Capitalizacion, GinA FINANCERA,
Feb. 29, 1988, at 15.
130. Not only must a layperson be able to understand the system, but it is extremely
important that the people who develop the system grasp how the foreign investor will per-
ceive the system. See Bentley, Debt Conversion in Latin America, 21 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.
37, 40 (1986). "The important thing is not that the remittance rights of conversion investors
be extraordinarily favorable but that they be clear, reliable and fair in relation to the remit-
tance rights of other classes of investors and creditors." Id. at 40.
131. In Mexico the rate of the discount depends on the intended use of the funds and
can vary from zero percent, for participation in state enterprises that the government wishes
to sell, to 25% for projects that do not generate foreign exchange and are not a government
priority. See Recent Development, International Debt, supra note 92, at 510.
132. In the Philippine model, the Central Bank redeems the debt at its face value, but
transactions related to priority investments are subject to a fee of five percent of the pesos
received, and non-priority investments are subject to a 10% fee. Id. at 511.
1989]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
tration is to attract new investors. 133 Then again, transfer of tech-
nology, employment requirements, and disclosure of information
are not specifically regulated and policies with regard to them re-
main unclear. This highlights the debate of regulation versus de-
regulation. Regulation does not necessarily indicate restriction, but
selectivity instead. The relative "openness" of Uruguay's legisla-
tion has not proven especially successful. Sophisticated, tailored
legislation may provide the answer.
Before new legislation can be suggested, however, one must
ask how any system would respond to Uruguay's needs and how
foreign investment would satisfy those needs. Promotion of Uru-
guay's exports, easier access to the world market, and alleviation of
the external debt may be only a few of the benefits that would be
realized through foreign investment. The FZA and the DESD spe-
cifically refer to an export promotion policy. The Foreign Invest-
ment Act does not mention an export promotion policy at all. The
absence is particularly detrimental because, as previously dis-
cussed, the Foreign Investment Act is generally the first document
that a foreign investor will review. 134 The DESD grants priority to
export projects;" 5 yet fails to set out any specific incentive to en-
courage participation. In contrast, the FZA is, by definition, a
formula for export promotion. Future foreign investment flows into
the country will most likely be channelled through the free zones
or through debt-equity conversions. Therefore, the most current
regulation will have a greater impact on foreign investment than
the more dated legislation.
The system, as a whole, fails to take full advantage of each
piece of legislation. The individual laws fail to function as a unit
but instead almost work against each other.136 Therefore, the ques-
tion of whether the legislation responds to Uruguay's need to at-
tract export-oriented foreign investment can be answered by say-
ing that the FZA is geared to that aim. For a country such as
133. See Latin Am. Regional Rep. South Cone, Aug. 6, 1987, at 7. See generally Corbo,
de Melo & Tybout, What Went Wrong with the Recent Reforms in the Southern Cone, 34
ECON. Dav. & CULTURAL CHANGE 607 (1986).
134. As a practical matter a local Uruguayan lawyer, and not the foreign investor, will
be evaluating options.
135. Decree 797/987, supra note 115, at art. 6.
136. The debt-equity mechanism could be used as a tool to exploit the free industrial
zones. Since a debt-to-equity swap requires that the investor be reimbursed with domestic




Uruguay, free zones are the most adequate tool that the law may
provide for achieving that purpose.
On the other hand, although the economic policy is oriented
towards regional integration with Argentina and Brazil, Uruguay's
foreign investment legislation does not include any specific provi-
sion specifically aimed at this goal. Argentina and Brazil have a
transport cost advantage, plus have their own transnational corpo-
rations. Therefore, Uruguay's foreign investment legislation should
concentrate on tapping those strategically located markets.
The legislation does not contain any provision that would act
to mitigate any damaging actions by transnational corporations.
For example, there are no norms designed to discourage the pro-
duction of undesired products, to restrict importation of capital-
intensive technologies, nor to prevent restrictive business practices
by transnational corporations. 3 ' Uruguay's foreign investment leg-
islation also fails to emphasize the country's need for investment in
underdeveloped or undeveloped sectors.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. Definition of a policy
A clear and articulated foreign investment policy is a neces-
sary precondition to the enactment of coherent legislation on the
subject. 3' The framers of any foreign investment policy should
take into consideration the following observations: 1) foreign in-
vestment should be viewed as only one instrument for achieving
developmental goals. The policy should be framed within a com-
prehensive development strategy based upon export-promotion in-
dustrialization; 2) policymakers must make every effort to inte-
grate the existing foreign investment legislation; 3) the policy must
be based on the recognition of the country's needs, and how such
needs might be satisfied in light of world trade and foreign invest-
ment trends; and 4) any policy should work towards integration
with Argentina and Brazil.
137. See IBRD/IMF Working Group on Access to Capital Markets, The Impact of Eco-
nomic Policies of Host Countries on the Flow and Net Benefits of Private Direct Invest-
ment in Developing Countries. Reprinted in 1 NEGOTIATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT 3.1D 1, 5-
7 (R. Hellawell & D. Wallace eds. 1982).
138. See Danino, Inversion Extranjera La Tentacion Pendular y Otras Opciones, 8
THEMis 33, 37 (1987).
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It is important to keep in mind while designing any foreign
investment policy, that the market for foreign investment is highly
competitive. A wide range of incentives may need to be offered in
order to attract investors."3 9 Uruguay must balance the costs of
granting inducements with the benefits derived in order to deter-
mine what, if any, incentives to offer.140 No policy will be neutral,
therefore all factors should be weighed carefully.14
Current Uruguayan law contains no explicit policy dealing
with technological transfer. Adopting a policy in this area is the
first step toward reconciling the local conditions with the technol-
ogy actually brought to the country. 14 2 Several developing coun-
tries have followed this trend and have adopted policies concerning
the inflow of foreign technology.
43
It is important to point out that the outcome of the system
depends not only on the benefits awarded by the FZA, but also on
the creation of a favorable climate for investment. That favorable
climate should include trade agreements granting preferential
tariff treatment to products exported from the zones, tax conven-
tions which guarantee that the tax benefits granted by the zones
will be recognized in the country of the investor's origin, and the
provision of physical and administrative infrastructure.1 44
B. Reform of the current regime
Reform of Uruguayan foreign investment legislation should
begin with unification of the scattered regulations. The Foreign In-
vestment Act, the FZA and the several tax and credit incentives
139. Those incentives could include offering the most liberal status and excessive in-
ducements with regard to tax concessions, exchange control, terms of credit, etc.
140. A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, INVESTING IN FREE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES 22-23, 65
(1984). This could be achieved by monitoring the experiences of competing host countries.
Clarification of an underlying policy may prevent Uruguayan legislators from making the
same mistakes as foreign legislators. Every country has its own particular problems and
therefore, the blanket adoption of foreign statutes will probably cause problems. However,
Uruguay can learn from those mistakes.
141. For a description of the cost/benefit analysis, see Wells, Social Cost/Benefit Anal-
ysis for Multinational Corporations, 1975 HARv. Bus. REV. 40 (1975).
142. Helleiner, El Papel de las Corporaciones Multinacionales en el Comercio de
Tecnologia de los Paises Menos Desarrollados, in 2 INDUSTRIALIZACION E INTERNACIONALIZA-
CION EN LA AMERICA LATINA 170 (F. Fajnzylber ed. 1981).
143. U.N. CENTER ON TRANSNAT'L CORP., SALIENT FEATURES AND TRENDS IN FOREIGN DI-
RECT INVESTMENT, at 21, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/14, U.N. Sales No. E.83.II.A.8 (1983).
144. A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 140, at 32-36.
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should be combined into a single document. 1 5 The rationale for
such unification is clear: foreign investors, faced with only one Act,
would be less likely to miss opportunities offered by one piece of
legislation and not the other.
A specific allocation of capital, based upon a pre-determined
policy, should be pursued. This allocation could be achieved by of-
fering differential tax treatment or the imposition of performance
requirements." 6 The DESD could provide for the imposition of
different discounts or a differential fee charge and therefore serve
to achieve this goal.1
47
The regulation of vertical-integration investment and of inter-
national subcontracting, inside and outside the zones, should be
diversified. Where an international subcontracting arrangement
with an independent domestic firm is entered into, careful atten-
tion must be paid to ensure that the domestic firm does not be-
come totally dependent on foreign intervention. 141 International
subcontracting, therefore, may be beneficial for the balance of pay-
ments, on the dissemination of technological knowledge, and on
the flow of foreign capital. 4 9 Specific legislation authorizing sub-
zones should be discussed since the same benefits that are derived
from a free zone can be achieved without the costs.
Investors from Argentina and Brazil should be given prefer-
ence over foreign investors from other countries. The negative im-
pact that transnational corporations might have on Uruguay would
be reduced due to the smaller size of Argentine or Brazilian trans-
national corporations. Plus, encouraging neighboring countries to
invest could promote regional integration, as well as provide other
advantages. 5 0 It is possible, however, that free zones will harm the
145. This could be done by decree and thereby avoid the natural delay of Parliamen-
tary discussions. The Debt-to-Equity Swap Decree could also be encompassed in the same
fashion. However, decrees can be modified easily and this characteristic would interfere with
attempted unification.
146. See U.N. CENTER ON TRANSNAT'L CORP., TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD
DEVELOPMENT, THIRD SURVEY, at 9, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/46, U.N. Sales No. E.83.II.A.14
(1983)[hereinafter UNCTC, TRANSNAT'L CORPS.].
147. See Munoz, La Conversion de la Deuda Externa en Inversion, 8 THEMIS 39, 43
(1987).
148. See THE GLOBAL FACTORY, supra note 69, at 250.
149. See Germidis, International Subcontracting and Industrialization for the Third
World Problems and Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL SUBCONTRACTING 10 (D. Germidis ed.
1980).
150. See Salacuse, Egypt's New Law on Foreign Investment: The Framework for Eco-
nomic Openness, 9 INT'L LAw. 647, 651-52 (1975). In comparative law, a preferential regime
1989]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
integration process. Argentine and Brazilian firms could feasibly
transfer part of their production to Uruguayan free zones with the
result that unemployment in their own country would increase.'
In specific areas where Uruguay lacks the required expertise
for development, foreign-run training programs should be required.
This is especially relevant in the tourism sector. Unless rapid
growth in the industry is accompanied by "indigenization" of deci-
sionmaking, transnational corporations will necessarily assume a
dominant role. 52
C. Implementation
Government involvement with foreign investment cannot stop
with the formulation of policy and the enactment of relevant regu-
lation. Any foreign investment plan that is to be successful re-
quires coherent implementation.
The implementation process comprehends several tasks: pro-
moting foreign investment, screening subsequent foreign invest-
ment proposals, negotiating the terms under which projects would
be accepted, and supervising the investments. These functions are
closely related, and therefore should be coordinated by a single
body. It is especially important to centralize- the negotiation and
decisionmaking functions. The more centralized the screening
body, the greater the bargaining power of the host government vis-
a-vis the foreign investor; the greater the bargaining power, the
more favorable the outcome of negotiations for the host.'5 3 More-
over, centralization allows for an overall evaluation of projects,
avoids contradictory policies, saves time, and is less costly to the
for only some foreign investors, is not new. This is the case of Egypt's foreign investment
law No. 43 of 1974, which discriminates between Arab and foreign capital in the area of
investments in housing. The intent of the law is to encourage Egyptian participation in
approved projects; Supervielle, Empresas Multinacionales en Latinoamerica, 57 LA Jus-
TICIA URUGUAYA, 43 (1968)(discussion of the role of Latin American transnational corpora-
tions in regional integration).
151. See Casson, Vertical Integration and Intra-Firm Trade, in MULTINATIONALS AND
WORLD TRADE 6-10 (M. Casson ed. 1986). Free zones may be beneficial even for the inves-
tor's country's economy to the extent that the zones allow domestic firms to keep their
competitive advantages by transfering part of their production processes to the zones.
152. UNCTC, TRANSNAT'L CoRPs., supra note 146, at 84.
153. See D. Encarnation & L. Wells, Competitive Strategies in Global Industries : A
View From The Host Country 11 (1984) (paper presented for the Colloqium on Competition
in Global Industries at Harvard Business School).
[Vol. 20:2
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
foreign investor.""4 Other points should also be considered at the
negotiating stage. For example, recommendations from interna-
tional institutions may be useful, and the role that technicians, in-
cluding, among others, economists, tax lawyers, and experts in ne-
gotiation, should be worked into the system.
Promotion of Uruguay as an important location for foreign in-
vestment is necessary. Without this promotion, developmental
goals will be impossible to achieve. The promotion campaign
abroad could be undertaken either by offices overseas or by Uru-
guayan representatives worldwide. So far, Uruguay has failed in ef-
fectively promoting the advantages of investing in the country.
The country's liberal foreign investment regulations are virtually
unknown.'55 In addtion, the investment literature prepared by the
government should be improved. Finally, an office with overall re-
sponsibility for gathering information about world market trends is
needed. This office would be able to participate in foreign invest-
ment policy development and should thereby improve the success
of a foreign investment plan.
VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
URUGUAY'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
This note argues that foreign investment can be instrumental
in assisting Uruguay in achieving developmental goals. Although
there is little likelihood that substantial foreign investment will re-
sult in the coming years, and although the legislation by itself can-
not be expected to have great success in attracting foreign invest-
ment, Uruguay needs an articulated policy and adequate
regulations. A small country such as Uruguay cannot afford inef-
fective foreign investment legislation. Every penny of foreign in-
vestment must be carefully utilized to achieve maximum results.
Foreign investment by itself will not bring development to
Uruguay. It should be only one instrument in an overall develop-
mental strategy. A developmental strategy is also a means and not
154. Id. at 73.
155. See generally U.N. CONF. FOR TRADE & DEV., EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IN DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C 2/
211/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.85.II.D.17 (1985)(omission of current Uruguayan free zones
from report). See also N. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, 3 TAX-FREE TRADE ZONES IN THE WORLD
(1988)(for the most authoritative and up-to-date guide on free zones. It does not include any
reference to the Uruguayan Free Zones Act, and the information that is included about
Uruguayan free zones is completely out of date.
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an end to achieving governmental goals to better the welfare of the
Uruguayan people. Development is, after all, about and for people.
This study has focused on the role of external forces in Uru-
guay's development, yet internal factors also play an important
role in the developmental process. These internal factors relate to
foreign investment policy and to the rest of the country's economic
policy as well. It is important to attract foreign investment for allo-
cation in certain areas, but it is essential that the capital be prop-
erly channeled. Both foreign investment and regional integration
may improve Uruguay's situation. Uruguay still has much to do in
the domestic sphere. To begin with, efforts should be made to im-
prove the country's educational system, to improve public sector
performance, and to build better infrastructure in rural areas. Al-
though Uruguay needs to persuade others that it is worthy of their
attention and investment, it also, and perhaps primarily, needs to
persuade itself.
